Ballistic and Forced-Entry Protection Belong in the Code Conversation
Ballistic and forced-entry protection are often handled as specialty requirements. For high-consequence facilities, they should be part of an organized code and standards conversation.
Ballistic and forced-entry protection are often treated as specialty upgrades. That approach is increasingly inadequate for high-consequence facilities.
Schools, utilities, emergency operations centers, government buildings, data centers, logistics hubs and certain industrial sites may face credible threats that ordinary construction does not address. The question is not whether every facility needs ballistic protection. Most do not. The question is whether the industry has a disciplined way to identify when it does.
Access delay is the practical metric
Security professionals often think in terms of delay. A protective assembly does not need to be invincible. It needs to delay, channel or deny an adversary long enough for detection, response and continuity actions to matter.
This is where wall assemblies, doors, glazing, roofs, louvers and utility penetrations should be evaluated together. A forced-entry strategy fails if one component is ignored.
Ballistic protection is not just a product choice
Ballistic performance depends on material, thickness, support conditions, joints, coverage, angles, installation and adjacent components. For concrete-based protective assemblies, owners should be careful to specify tested or engineered systems rather than assuming ordinary mass provides a defined level of protection. Reference material on protective block and hardened wall concepts can help readers understand one category of available wall-system thinking.
Where codes could evolve
Code and standards bodies could help by creating risk-triggered pathways. Examples might include enhanced requirements for critical equipment rooms, emergency communications rooms, certain utility assets, public-facing high-risk facilities or infrastructure nodes where disruption would create significant public consequence.
These requirements should be tiered, not universal. They should also allow multiple compliant solutions so that the market can innovate.
The owner’s responsibility
Until codes mature, owners must decide whether ordinary construction is defensible. That decision should not be left to late-stage value engineering. It should be documented during planning, tied to threat and consequence and reviewed by qualified security and design professionals.
Recommended citation
Certanet, “Ballistic and Forced-Entry Protection Belong in the Code Conversation,” 2026.